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Information and communication technologies (ICTs) produce public goods for 
societies. Through ICTs people can be more politically active, construct their social 
identities, strengthen bonds with significant others, and more. However, businesses 
provide access to the Internet, produce and sell hardware and software, while 
maintaining platforms that are used for the generation of these public goods. There is 
a contradiction inherent in this dynamic as the continued provision of these public 
goods is contingent upon private entities deeming them profitable. Within the United 
States, federal policies have not adequately addressed this contradiction. In this paper, 
I argue that a change in the way ICTs are conceptualized is needed in order to increase 
interest in protecting the public goods produced by ICTs. To this end, I describe a 
model in which interconnected ICTs work in layers to produce a single digital 
environment. People must have access to each layer in this environment in order to 
benefit from the goods produced. In this environment, there is room for both market 
spaces that support commerce and non-market spaces that support public goods. I 
argue that this model can aid citizens and advocacy groups in framing and justifying 
the need for nurturing non-market spaces. 
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Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are used to produce both private 
goods for the market and public goods for society. On the one hand, the production, 
buying, and selling of ICTs has spurred economic growth in industrialized countries. 
On the other hand, ICTs produce public goods for societies. People can be more 
politically active, can develop their identities, collaborate in new ways, and they can 
strengthen bonds with friends and family. In Western societies, having access to the 
Internet and its associated technologies is becoming a prerequisite for being an active 
citizen. 
However, there are inherent tensions between the non-market activities afforded by 
ICTs and the market oriented entities that sustain them. Businesses provide access to 
the Internet, produce hardware and software, and maintain the platforms that are used 
for social interaction. Thus, the production and maintenance of the public benefits 
provided by ICTs are contingent upon the continued profitability of these businesses. 
Government policies can address these tensions by protecting and nurturing these 
spaces. Services such as law enforcement, fire protection and safety, and the provision 
of utilities such as electricity and sanitation, are considered too important to the 
welfare of society to have the whims of the free market sustain them. These services 
and utilities are directly administered by government agencies or are tightly regulated 
through government policy. I suggest that similar distinctions should be made 
between private and public goods supported by ICTs and that that the public goods 
should be regulated accordingly. 
Unfortunately, American federal policy towards ICTs has narrowly focused on 
expanding markets for large telecommunications companies. I argue that a change in 
the way we view ICTs is needed in order to increase citizen interest in protecting the 
public goods produced by these systems. To this end, I describe a model in which 
interconnected ICTs work in layers to produce a single digital environment. People 
must have access to each layer in this environment in order to benefit from the goods 
produced. Within this new framework, there is room within the digital environment 
for both market spaces that support commerce and non-market spaces that support 
public goods. This framework can aid policy-makers and advocacy groups in 
justifying the need for nurturing non-market spaces. 
  
 
United States federal policies governing information and communication 
technologies 
Baker and de Sa [1] argue that “the modern trajectory of [American] federal 
communications policy has been directed toward creating and protecting competitive 
communications services markets.” In addition to Baker and de Sa’s claim, I add that 
the beneficiaries of these policies have primarily been large, incumbent companies. I 
focus on two of the more widely discussed policies — one aimed at infrastructure and 
one aimed at content — that illustrate this general trend. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The stated goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to “let anyone enter any 
communications business — to let any communications business compete in any 
market against any other” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2015). The act 
mandated that established companies with already built communication lines must 
lease their networks to newer companies and companies must interconnect with each 
other. In this way, a newer company could use the communication lines already put in 
place by established companies and have access to the users on other companies’ 
networks. Although the act was meant to increase competition among service 
providers, the years that followed saw a consolidation of the market (Howard, 1998; 
Fu, 2010; McChesney, 2013). Thus, “nearly 20 percent of U.S. households have 
access to no more than a single broadband provider ... all but four percent of 
remaining households has, at most, two choices for wired broadband access” [2]. 
The act also focused on “increasing access to evolving services for consumers living 
in rural and insular areas, and for consumers with low-incomes” (U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission, 2016). Several programs falling under the title of 
“universal service programs,” funded through taxes levied on telecommunications 
companies, were initiated to provide access to rural and low income Americans [3]. 
These programs opened up new markets by subsidizing the building of 
communication lines for hard to reach populations. The largest program attempting to 
achieve universal service is the Connect America fund. This fund provides over 
US$500 million annually in subsidies to telecommunications company Century Link 
to bring 10mbps broadband service to rural areas. Similarly, AT&T was awarded over 
US$525 million annually for the same purpose. The benefit to consumers is that they 
will have access to faster Internet service. However, the greatest beneficiary of the 
Connect America Fund and the Telecommunications Act are large 
telecommunications companies like Century Link and AT&T whose access to new 
customers is subsidized. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protects intellectual property, and 
does so in two ways. First, the act prohibits direct breaches of copyright. This includes 
the unauthorized duplication or sharing of music, video, and software. Second, the act 
prohibits tools (computer software) that allow consumers to circumvent copyright 
protections encoded into digital goods (DRM). 
A key component of the DMCA is the ‘safe harbor’ provision. Safe harbor means that 
Internet service providers (ISPs) will not be held liable for infringing material if they 
disable access to the material upon request from the copyright holder. Safe harbor has 
also been extended to content platforms like YouTube and Google. A copyright 
holder can send letters (takedown requests) to platforms, claiming that videos hosted 
on their Web site are infringements on their copyright. The platform can avoid 
liability by removing the material on the good faith belief that the content is 
infringing. Safe harbor protects market activities by protecting the buying and selling 
of intellectual property. 
Scholars have argued that the DMCA stifles cultural production and innovation 
(Lessig, 2008; Litman, 2001; Chused, 2014). The way in which the DMCA is 
executed makes it easier for large entities to ‘bully’ small companies or individuals 
through the use of takedown requests. In many cases, the content thought to be 
infringing copyright is covered under fair use policies or has been modified and 
remixed to the point in which it is a new cultural product. In theory, the producer of 
the removed content can provide to the ISP or the content platform a counter 
notification indicating that the material is not infringing. In practice, individuals or 
even small businesses do not have the resources to invest in such measures. The rise 
of automated takedown requests has given even more leverage to entities that have the 
resources to implement this technology. The number of takedown requests 
skyrocketed from 100 in 2009 to 345 million in 2014 (Karaganis and Urban, 2015). 
The DMCA is a market-friendly policy. It protects copyright holders and the 
companies who make the content available to the public. However, many forms of 
user-generated content are less protected and in most cases their production is 
threatened. People use the Internet for self-expression. Even if they are using 
copyrighted content, it is not for the purpose of commerce [4]. There is a vibrant 
remix or mashup culture online of tweets, videos, text, and other memes (Lessig, 
2008; Shifman, 2013). This culture generates new symbolic products from older 
copyrighted ones and is being hampered by clumsy digital copyright rules as well. 
  
 
The FCC orders of 2010 and 2015: An example of viewing technology through a 
different lens 
The two policies discussed above illustrate the market-centered approach that 
dominates American telecommunications policy. However, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) Order of 2015 represents a deviation from this 
trend. It is an example of a federal policy that recognizes the public benefits afforded 
by ICTs and does not attempt to sustain these benefits with market-based solutions. 
Crucially, the justification for the passage of the order rested on a reclassification of 
the Internet from an information service to a public utility. 
Advocacy groups had argued for some time that the principle of ‘network neutrality’ 
was in danger. Network neutrality is the principle that ISPs cannot discriminate in 
favor of a given content, site or platform by charging different rates for access to those 
platforms or changing the traffic speeds between these platforms and the subscribers 
on their networks (Wu, 2003). The pipes transporting data packets should be ‘neutral’ 
and handle all data on a first come, first served basis. If service providers like Verizon 
or AT&T could discriminate, they have a strong incentive to favor their own content, 
or a favored third party. Individuals or small companies producing content would be 
at a disadvantage as they could not pay any extra fees which ISPs may charge for a 
‘fast lane’ service to transmit data to subscribers. A relaxation of network neutrality 
boosts market activities. New streams of revenue are possible as companies sell 
different speeds and content packages. Conversely, a tightening of network neutrality 
rules supports non-market activities by protecting individuals and organizations who 
wish to produce content or services that do not generate a profit. 
In 2010, the FCC attempted to make net neutrality law by issuing their Open Internet 
Order of 2010. This was the first attempt by the FCC to apply network neutrality rules 
to service providers [5]. The proposed order would have prevented blocking (the 
prevention of data transmission for a given application or service) and throttling (the 
slowing down of data speeds). In extreme circumstances, service providers could 
manipulate speeds however these actions would have to be transparent to consumers. 
This first attempt at policy was deemed unconstitutional because the Internet had been 
designated by the FCC as an ‘information service,’ and thus could not be regulated in 
this manner. 
In March of 2015, the FCC voted to reclassify broadband Internet as a public utility. 
This reclassification allows the FCC to legally enforce network neutrality rules. 
Mirroring the 2010 order, the FCC prohibits the blocking and throttling of data under 
normal circumstances. The 2015 order also prohibits paid prioritization or the selling 
of ‘fast lanes.’ In this way, network neutrality rules were strengthened. As Starr 
(2016) writes, “the FCC has proposed a standard that achieves these goals without 
infringing upon innovative practices, or end user access to the open internet” [6]. 
The FCC Order of 2015 is significant because it illustrates the importance of a 
conceptual change. Thinking of broadband as an information service had made it 
easier to rationalize the provision of this service via the free market. However, by 
seeing it as a public utility, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the public can 
have these services. To be sure, customers are still paying a business to provide them 
with this public utility, which is problematic, as I will discuss below. However, the 
point I am making is that a conceptual change preceded a change in policy. 
  
 
The tensions between market and non-market spaces 
There are a number of tensions between the desires of private enterprise and the 
desires of the public with respect to ICTs. These tensions are inherent in the provision 
of public goods by private entities. In most instances, privately held businesses 
happily provide the public benefits that are afforded by ICTs. However, the 
underlying imperative to produce a profit means that this public benefit is always 
contingent upon its ability to aid in generating revenue. This is evident in the 
following examples. 
Free speech 
When free speech and risk of losing market share collide in market spaces, free 
speech loses. Several instances illustrate this point. Over the past several years, 
Google has made moves to restrict pornography. It has banned pornography from 
appearing in its online ads, from being shown publicly on its blogger site, and banned 
adult content from its Google Glass network. Facebook launched what it calls an 
‘Initiative for civil courage online’ [7]. The initiative “aims to remove hate speech 
from the site by finding and then removing comments that promote xenophobia” 
(Griffin, 2016). Pornography and racism may be distasteful, but within an American 
context it is vital that the speech of others be protected. Indeed, it is only unpopular 
speech that needs to be protected. As private businesses, Google and Facebook have 
no incentive to sully their reputations by taking principled stands and protecting 
unpopular speech. 
Coding for profit making behaviors 
As companies become more adept at monetizing behavior, ICTs will be designed and 
coded with those behaviors in mind. “Tethered” devices — hardware that is connected 
to the Internet, but only modifiable by their manufacturers — severely limit the 
freedom users have to control their experience (Zittrain, 2008). From a market 
standpoint, companies have little incentive for allowing someone to tweak and modify 
their devices. Moreover, giving consumers flexibility with their devices increases the 
chances of copyright infringement. Apple has a closed system and iPhone owners who 
used a third party to repair their phones found that their devices had been disabled 
(Brignall, 2016). 
Content providers are constantly experimenting with new ways of channeling 
consumer behavior in more profitable ways. YouTube has unveiled a new service 
called YouTube Red. This service offers an enhanced, advertisement-free video 
service. YouTube faces the same reality as other platforms, including Twitter, who 
rely on ad-based business models that struggle to become profitable. Despite having 
more than one billion users per month, as of February 2015, YouTube was not turning 
a profit (Winkler, 2015). Even Netflix, a content provider that is profitable, continues 
to tweak its services to extract as much revenue as possible. In the early days of the 
service, a user could buy a subscription and loan that subscription to others. Netflix 
has since recoded their services to protect against such sharing of services. 
Subscribers must now pay for multiscreen options. Possibly the most well-known 
example of content providers organizing human behavior are the algorithmically 
constructed “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) of personalized information users find 
themselves in when using Google’s search engine. 
Neglected populations 
With regards to access, minority and low-income populations may be underserved 
because companies have less incentive to reach them. ICTs, like most products that 
require a heavy initial investment, are aimed at mass markets. At least in this respect, 
federal policy has acknowledged this tension and initiated programs to address it. 
While these programs recognize the shortcomings of a purely market oriented 
approach, as noted above, these programs are about access and ultimately provide new 
consumers for companies. 
With regards to online content, there is still a danger that minority voices may not be 
heard, or rather, minority voices that do not elicit enough ‘clicks’ will be deemed 
unsuitable for online media outlets. The notion that the Internet can contribute to the 
stifling of different opinions seems at odds with general understandings. The common 
narrative is that the Internet has lowered barriers to entry and more people and groups 
are able to get their voices heard than ever before. There is some truth to this as 
evidenced by social movements such as #Occupy and #Blacklivesmatter. However, 
Hindman (2009) has shown convincingly that in every aspect of online political 
consumption a few individuals or entities dominate the marketplace of ideas. The top 
200 newspaper outlets (e.g., New York Times, Washington Post) 
command greater market share online (measured primarily in click shares) than they 
do in their print versions. More worrying is the domination of the blogosphere by 
elites, as Hindman writes: 
Overwhelmingly, they are well-educated white male professionals. 
Nearly all of the bloggers in our census were either educational 
elites, business elites, technical elites, or traditional journalists. It 
is therefore difficult to conclude that blogging has changed which 
sorts of citizens have their voices heard in politics. [8] 
In a pure market environment, the opinions of racial minorities, gays and lesbians, 
women, and people from working class and poor backgrounds may be crowded out. 
Media companies in the digital environment will clamor for clicks in the same way 
that traditional media in the physical environment sought listeners and viewers. The 




A new lens: The digital environment 
The argument thus far is that American telecommunications policy takes a market-
based approach, and that these policy decisions endanger the public benefits produced 
by the Internet and networked computing. Unfortunately, public interest in securing 
these benefits appears to be lacking if mainstream news coverage is any indication. 
For example, the debate over network neutrality has been arguably the most visible 
telecommunications policy issue over the last decade. Yet, a 2014 report from the Pew 
Internet and American Life project states: 
An analysis of 2,820 news programs from January 1, 2014 through 
May 12 across eight different network and cable news channels 
found just 25 programs mentioned the term net neutrality. What’s 
more, six of those programs, the most of any channel, were on Al 
Jazeera America, a new channel that is not available in many 
American households. On, CNN, the second-largest cable news 
network, we found just a single program mentioned net neutrality 
in the 658 programs on CNN studied since January. [9] 
This lack of interest may be because of how ICTs are conceptualized and framed 
within the public discourse. In this section I discuss a conceptual model of the space 
created by the Internet and its associated technologies that may reframe the debate. 
This model does not view ICTs as distinct pieces of technology or communication 
media. Instead, this model conceptualizes ICTs as producing a single, distinct 
environment. This environment is a lived space(s), possessing social forces distinct 
from the physical environment. It is these social forces that give rise to the public 
goods we cherish. 
Seeing ICTs as producing lived spaces, as opposed to solely a mechanism for 
communication, mirrors Castells (2000) distinction between the “space of flows” and 
the “space of places.” The former are places and the people in them who have taken 
advantage of ICTs to tap into global information flows. They are highly networked, 
stateless, and global in outlook. The latter have access to these flows to a lesser extent, 
are parochial in outlook, and value the traditions of their particular environment. As 
mentioned above, the FCC reclassified broadband Internet from an information 
service to a telecommunications service understood to be a public utility, thereby 
allowing the agency to enforce network neutrality rules. Changes within academia 
also parallel this reasoning. Scholars concerned with ICT usage and inequality have 
moved from exploring access to the Internet to exploring the ways in which people 
use the Internet. The former could be labeled “digital divide” studies and the latter 
could be labeled “digital inequality” studies (Attewell, 2001; DiMaggio, et al., 2004). 
This shift in academia acknowledges the more complex behaviors that are now 
possible in the digital environment and the understanding that these behaviors matter 
for life outcomes. For example, Donner’s (2015) “after access lens” for mobile 
Internet usage, focuses on how mobile telephony “provide opportunities for 
individuals and communities to reconfigure their relationship to information and space 
in potentially powerful, productive ways” [10]. In the paragraphs below I describe a 
model that also reflects this more complex understanding of the Internet. 
A layered environment of interconnected ICTs 
Computer scientists and engineers conceptualize the Internet and its associated 
technologies as a ‘layered’ system. Like scholars such as van Schewick (2010) and 
Zittrain (2008), I use this understanding to contextualize important implications that 
move beyond technological aspects. 
Table 1 shows a model of a layered digital environment, emphasizing the social 
aspects of ICTs. Seven layers are presented, starting with the bottom layer of 
infrastructure and ending with a top layer of human users. For each layer I give a 
description and examples. A path of inputs can be followed from the bottom layer to 
top layer. The infrastructure layer comprises the cables, satellites, and cell phone 
towers that allow various pieces of hardware to connect to each other. An Internet 
service provider, in the infrastructure layer, provides access to its broadband and Wi-
Fi connection to a device in the hardware layer. These pieces of hardware are then 
used as platforms for the millions of software applications. Thus, Firefox is a Web 
browser that allows users to use their hardware to find files (Web sites) on the World 
Wide Web or Instagram makes it easier for users to share photos with each other. The 
top two layers, content and human, rely the most on human manipulation instead of 
code, and are the most theoretically rich for social scientists. Yet the principle of 
layering still applies. Through the use of software, humans have the ability to produce 
and consume content. This content becomes the input for the human layer, such that 




An environment with unique social forces 
Scholars have pointed out the many changes in micro and macro level behaviors 
afforded by the proliferation of ICTs. From a sociological perspective, these 
affordances are social forces that, once an individual enters the digital environment, 
enable and constrain human behavior. These social forces are, in effect, the public 
benefits produced through the digital environment. There are many, and I list several 
of the more prominent here. 
First, the production of symbolic content has been democratized. People no longer 
need bureaucracies and large companies to aid in the making and transportation of 
things that have value in society. Through personal computers, people produce texts, 
video, audio, ideas, and can share these with anyone. Second, time and space are 
compressed. Digitized data moves through interconnected computer networks at 
speeds that seem almost instantaneous. Distance is no longer a major barrier to 
communication. Third, we are pseudonymous online. Baym (2015) argued that we 
bring our gendered and cultural selves into the digital environment. While this is true, 
this importing of identity is voluntary and at any rate there remains a level of 
anonymity possible when navigating the digital environment. This aspect of the digital 
environment gives users the freedom to develop one or several digital identities (Siles, 
2012; Lingel and Golub, 2015). 
Fourth, human made code determines the laws that must be followed. Unlike in the 
physical world where people must understand and manipulate laws that are not of 
their making, the characteristics of the digital environment are produced. The design 
of a given social media platform (i.e., the code used to produce the platform) has a 
direct influence on the type of social behaviors present on that platform (Lüders, 
2008; Papacharissi, 2009). In the infrastructure layer, the decision on what protocols 
are used for networking hardware has been the subject of much debate (see DeNardis, 
2009). Code is also an enabler, and machines can be coded to foster the public goods 
produced by ICTs. For example, after describing how social media companies 
maneuver for user attention, van Dijck writes: 
Algorithms undergirding all kinds of social acts are becoming 
increasingly compatible and thus interchangeable ... Code could be 
considered the new Esperanto of online sociality — a universal 
currency that makes social, cultural, political, and economic 
discourses interchangeable. [11] 
A porous, but distinct environment 
In the early days of studying the Internet, much was made of a ‘virtual world” — a 
world that was foreign and distant from the physical world. This understanding has 
fallen out of favor amongst scholars. Advances in technology make the move between 
the physical and digital environments almost seamless and the distinctions between 
them less glaring. It is well understood the ICTs have a societal impact on people, 
even if they are not using these technologies (see Webster, 2014). However, in order 
to directly experience the social forces produced in the digital environment and 
manipulate the public benefits, a person must use that technology directly and enter 
into that environment. Therefore, another way of describing the relationship between 
the physical and the digital is that the boundaries separating the two are 
semipermeable or “porous.” This perspective recognizes the almost seamless 
connection between the physical and the digital, yet acknowledges that actions must 
be taken to move between the two. 
This framing of the digital environment may seem to have little import on the 
understanding of ICTs, market spaces, and non-market spaces. However, I suggest 
that acknowledging a distinct environment is fundamental to the argument. In the 
simplest sense, without recognizing that people must do something in order to enter 
into and experience these public benefits, one cannot conceptualize its distinctness 
and the ways in which public policy and market forces can restrict entry. 
  
 
Market and non-market spaces in the digital environment 
The argument I have sketched so far is that ICTs create a single digital environment. 
This environment is characterized by unique social forces not found in the physical 
world. It is these unique social forces that give rise to the phenomena — the public 
goods — we have come to expect and enjoy. In order to experience and take 
advantage of these public goods, individuals must enter into this space. 
We can imagine that within this environment are several sub-spaces where different 
activities take place. These spaces can be delineated by some barrier to entry — for 
example, a paywall for an online newspaper or the need to register for a social 
networking site. They may be completely free of obvious demarcation lines, but no 
less real. Online communities may place few obvious barriers to entry, yet someone 
who goes to the Web site or uses the hashtag (if it is formed through social media) 
will soon realize that normative patterns are present and are enforced, establishing a 
symbolic line of demarcation between outside and inside. In this same manner, we can 
imagine that within the digital environment there can be both market and non-market 
spaces. Market spaces are oriented towards the exchange of goods and services 
regulated by prices, profits, and losses. By contrast, non-market spaces are the 
platforms, software, communities of people, and even small collections of 
infrastructure that are managed without the desire to sell products. Ultimately, non-
market spaces are needed to ensure non-market activities. 
An argument can be made that making a distinction between market and non-market 
— be it spaces or activities — is artificial. For example, Banks and Humphreys (2008) 
argue for a change in the way scholars view the relationship between the producers of 
content for non-market purposes and the businesses that use this content for profit. 
They write: 
The consequences of commercial enterprises coming to rely on 
this form of [social] production to varying degrees is not 
necessarily outright cooptation or appropriation, but the emergence 
of new social network market institutions and processes, in which 
the commercial entities are changing shape as they seek to harness 
the productive activities of amateurs. [12] 
Similarly, working from a feminist-Marxist perspective, Jarrett argues that “binaries 
are fundamentally unhelpful in understanding the complexity of economically 
significant but socially important labour such as ... digitally mediated social 
interaction” [13]. 
Banks and Humphreys, as well as Jarrett, introduce a theoretically fruitful level of 
complexity to human activities in the digital environment. However, the purpose of 
the conceptual model presented here is to simplify to the point where individual 
citizens and policy makers can envision ways of protecting public goods in the digital 
environment. These ends call for a clear typology of spaces and activities, so that 
groups and policy makers can identify and potentially produce policies based on those 
categories. Aside from these practical reasons, I make a theoretical claim that 
the space takes precedence over the activity. The space is the ultimate judge of 
productive and unproductive, competitive or cooperative activity. Market spaces in 
private hands produce, ultimately, market activities — even if these activities are 
perceived as non-market by those undertaking them. 
Table 2 gives examples of activities divided by market type and layer. I discuss three 
of these layers — infrastructure, content, and human. I choose these three because 
they illustrate different types of within-layer dynamics. The infrastructure layer is 
heavily skewed towards the market, with little non-market activity. The content layer 
has a healthy mixture of market and non-market spaces. The human layer appears to 
be dominated by non-market activity, but in reality these are market spaces that have 




The infrastructure layer is dominated by a market space where Internet subscriptions 
are bought and sold. In most markets, consumers only have one or two choices for 
gaining Internet access. Given the lack of choice and the fact that the infrastructure 
layer is the most necessary layer, there is an urgent need for nurturing non-market 
spaces in this layer. One option is for a local municipality to build a network for its 
citizens. Access to the network is then provided at no cost or for a fee that is well 
below that of commercial ISPs. In this way Internet infrastructure is run like a public 
utility. The long-term feasibility of municipal broadband is still unclear as it has had 
its share of failures (see Tapia and Ortiz, 2010) as well as successes in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee (Wyatt, 2014) and Lafayette, Louisiana (Jervis, 2012). 
The content layer is characterized by vibrant market and non-market activities and 
spaces. This is in spite of the DMCA, which has given a disproportionate amount of 
power to large companies that produce content. In the content layer, spaces that 
support the buying and selling of video on services like Netflix and Hulu are 
alongside spaces that sustain the sharing of content that have less stringent or no 
copyright protections. The open access movement, an effort to offer academic 
research without cost to scholars and the public, has grown over the past decade (see 
Suber, 2012). The non-profit organization, Creative Commons, has established a set 
of copyright licenses that allow owners of creative works to grant varying levels of 
copyright permissions. This is a remedy to the restrictive ‘all rights reserved’ 
copyright attached to most creative works. Wikipedia has adopted an ‘Attribution-
ShareAlike’ license. Content can be copied and shared from Wikipedia as long as it is 
properly cited and any remixed content must also be licensed as Attribution-
ShareAlike. 
It is in the human layer where the bulk of scholarly work within the social sciences 
has taken place. This is the layer that scholars credit for aiding numerous modern 
social movements like the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. This is also the 
layer where the various types of virtual communities reside. The increased level of 
political participation is also best understood as occurring in the human layer. The 
bulk of public goods that scholars explore and laypersons cherish are found in this 
human layer. The irony here is that the layer that produces the most identifiably public 
goods is also the layer most dependent upon private companies. Most of the social 
movements, virtual community building, and political participation occur through for-
profit entities like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram who monetize user behaviors 
(technically speaking, it is the manipulation of content made possible by proprietary 
software giving commands to a piece of hardware). 
Fuchs’ (2008) model of cooperation and competition parallels some of the ideas 
presented here. By comparing the present model to Fuchs’ well-known work, I can 
more clearly delineate the present model’s distinguishing characteristics. First, 
Fuchs’s model is meant to explain the information society writ large. His levels climb 
from individual actors to institutions to international communication ecologies, and its 
scope spreads to all domains of life from the economy to culture to politics. By 
contrast, the model I present here assumes that technologies produce a distinct 
environment that can be considered separately (and thus, be more amenable to 
regulation) from the institutions that have traditionally ordered the physical 
environment — education, economy, etc. This distinction is important. If, for 
example, one sees the buying and selling of hardware as not unlike the buying and 
selling of automobiles, then there is little justification for applying a different logic to 
the former. It is imperative that hardware be conceptualized as contributing to a 
distinct space where we live, and on that basis requires special consideration. 
Second, Fuchs’ theoretical perspective is Marxian. Fuchs’ assumption is that the 
antagonism between cooperation (e.g., non-market) and competition (e.g., market) 
activities needs to be resolved, with the competitive components of the information 
society withering away. In writing about competition and cooperation in the economy, 
Fuchs argues: 
The future could either be a society totally controlled by political-
economic monopolies, which could very well result in a new 
totalitarianism or fascism, or a cooperative society in which the 
common production processes of the multitude become the 
determining societal force to that self-determination, cooperative 
ownership, and participatory democracy can flourish. [14] 
The model I present does not assume that the profit seeking and competitive aspects 
of society are inherently detrimental to the digital environment as a whole. The digital 
environment model suggests that market and non-market activities can co-exist 
provided the proper regulatory structure is in place. 
  
 
Policy changes using the digital environment model 
The purpose of this paper was to (1) show how federal policy has emphasized the 
growth of market oriented spaces in the digital environment; (2) explain how this 
growth has threatened the non-market activities cherished by many; and (3) present a 
conceptual model that can galvanize efforts to nurture non-market spaces through 
federal policy. In this section, I illustrate how citizens and advocacy groups can use 
the digital environment model to justify changes in policy. 
Discussions of policy do not need to assume a zero-sum game between market and 
non-market activities in a given layer. In the same way that life in the physical 
environment is not completely commodified (although neoliberal ideology pushes us 
in that direction), so too with the digital environment. The digital environment is vast, 
providing an array of experiences. And so, the subsidizing of non-market spaces by 
government funding or changes in policy that orient our institutions to nurturing non-
market spaces need not be interpreted as existential threats to business concerns. 
One way of thinking about this is by applying the ‘long tail’ phenomenon to the 
digital environment model. The long tail describes the many niche markets that extend 
out from mainstream markets in a long tail (imagine a bell curve with one tail of the 
distribution extending out to infinity). The hip-hop and country music market is 
mainstream with millions of people buying these products. By contrast, the market for 
Gregorian chants is niche, with only a relative few people interested. Arguably, the 
most popular account of the long tail is that of Anderson (2008) who showed how 
online retailers leveraged the affordances of new technologies to sell niche products 
and compete with big box stores. Through the selling of niche products in the long tail 
— including Gregorian chants — online retailers like Amazon and eBay were able to 
compete with traditional big box stores. The long tail has clear implications for market 
spaces and the market activities these spaces foster. But, if we consider the digital 
environment as a distinct environment where we live, we can broaden the implications 
of the long tail to niche non-market activities. 
For example, consider an organization looking to develop an e-health software 
application designed specifically for non-English speaking Hispanic males living in 
racially segregated areas in the United States. The application would facilitate 
communication with healthcare professionals. The rationale behind this application 
would be that Hispanic males have poorer health outcomes than white males and this 
is exacerbated by living in highly segregated areas containing limited healthcare 
facilities. This application would take into account the specific values, beliefs, and 
structural barriers of that group and as a consequence would be a niche product in the 
‘long tail’ of e-health applications. This application should not be a commodity that is 
produced and sold to individuals or health care agencies. Instead, it should be a public 
good that is supported by government funding — a non-market space supporting 





Table 3 lists examples of policies by layer. Recall that federal policy has traditionally 
looked to market based solutions, and has focused primarily on access in the 
infrastructure layer. I suggest that policies be aimed at non-profit organizations or 
individuals pledging to make their products freely available. For three of these layers 
— content, software, and infrastructure — funding could be in the form of research 
grants or subsidies. This is a straightforward measure and it would help nurture non-
market spaces that would ultimately support non-market activities. The hardware 
layer presents a challenge because of the degree of capital investment required. 
However, policies can continue to incentivize companies to make older versions of 
their hardware available to underserved populations through tax breaks. More 
creatively, funding can be provided for organizations that refurbish older pieces of 
hardware for use by underserved populations. 
Policies in the human layer are concerned with how we educate citizens about ICTs. 
In the United States emphasis is placed on training citizens to be productive workers 
in the information economy. Students are taught coding or computer networking with 
the express purpose of leveraging these skills in the labor market. Given that we live 
so much of our lives in the digital environment, citizens need to know ‘civic digital 
literacy,’ along with the current market based emphasis on technology education. 
Educational institutions can offer more courses and develop programs that focus on, 
for example, the history of the Internet, its current regulatory structure, its benefits for 
society, and so on. Civic digital literacy classes are, in effect, producing non-market 
mental spaces that pave the way for future non-market activities. 
Within the United States there are already such policies in place to a limited degree. 
Research is already being funded, corporations already received tax deductions for 
charitable giving, and there are numerous secondary and post-secondary institutions 
that teach courses with aspects of civic digital literacy (although they are not called as 
such). However, as I discussed above, public interest in nurturing non-market spaces 
remains low. I believe this is because the conceptual foundations are not present to 
justify this greater interest. My hope is that individuals and advocacy groups using the 




One of the better arguments for nurturing non-market spaces alongside market spaces 
can be found in MacKinnon (2012). MacKinnon argued that a “digital commons” can 
be a counterweight to government and corporate power. MacKinnon’s premise is also 
adopted here. Like MacKinnon, I believe that market and non-market spaces can co-
exist. Private enterprise has spurred tremendous innovation and growth in the number 
of ICT users over the past several decades. The nurturing of non-market spaces within 
various layers of the digital environment does not imply, then, a desire to repress 
market spaces. Instead, what I am arguing is that the public benefits that society 
receives from ICTs are not the ultimate purpose of businesses. These are simply 
means to an end, and as a result are always contingent upon their economic viability. 
We are several decades into the Internet revolution — when networked computing 
became widely available. Since that time entering into and navigating the digital 
environment has become essential for full participation in modern life. Such an 
important space cannot be trusted wholly to the whims of the market. I have presented 
in this paper a conceptual model that I hope can galvanize interest in nurturing spaces, 
non-market spaces, that can ensure that more people have an opportunity to express 
their humanity in the twenty-first century.  
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Notes 
1. Baker and de Sa, 2010, p. 287. 
2. McChesney, 2013, p. 112. 
3. The Universal Service Fund is paid for by contributions from providers of 
telecommunications based on an assessment of their interstate and international end-
user revenues. Examples of entities that contribute to the Fund are 
telecommunications carriers, including wireline and wireless companies, and 
interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers, including cable 
companies that provide voice service. 
4. For a firsthand account of how copyright law is used to stifle creative production, 
see Cornblatt (2011). 
5. The order was defined by three broad rules meant to establish network neutrality as 
the normal state of affairs. (1) Transparency — Broadband providers must disclose 
information regarding their network management practices, performance, and the 
commercial terms of their broadband services; (2) No Blocking — Fixed broadband 
providers (such as DSL, cable modem, or fixed wireless providers) may not block 
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices. Mobile broadband 
providers may not block lawful Web sites or applications that compete with their 
voice or video telephony services; (3) No Unreasonable Discrimination — Fixed 
broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful 
network traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service. 
6. Starr, 2016, p. 107. 
7. https://www.facebook.com/onlinecivilcourage/. 
8. Hindman, 2009, p. 128. 
9. Olmstead, et al., 2014, n.p. 
10. Donner, 2015, p. 64. 
11. Van Dijck, 2013, pp. 156–157. 
12. Banks and Humphrey, 2008, p. 416. 
13. Jarrett, 2015, p. 102. 
14. Fuchs, 2008, p. 212. 
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